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The Standard of Care for the Medical
Specialist in Ohio: Bruni v. Tatsumi
In a medical malpractice action, as in any action for negligence,
the plaintiff must show the defendant's failure to exercise the standard
of care that the law imposes. Except for those instances in which the
alleged negligence of a medical practitioner involves a matter clearly
within the comprehension of lay jurors, the standard of care by which
the medical malpractice defendant is to be judged must be developed
by expert testimony presented by the plaintiff because jurors are gen-
eraly considered incapable of resolving technical medical issues by
themselves.1 Preliminarily, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his ex-
pert witness is in fact competent to testify as to the standard by which
the defendant's conduct should be judged. This necessity for compe-
tent expert testimony has often proved to be a troublesome area of
proof for the medical malpractice plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently eased the plaintiff's
burden in establishing the applicable standard of care and in demon-
strating the competency of an expert medical witness. In Bruni v.
Tatsum2 the court held that the standard of care for one engaged in
the practice of a "board-certified medical specialty" is that of a reason-
able specialist practicing the same specialty, taking into account present
scientific knowledge in that area of medicine. Departing from prior
Ohio law, the court expressly held that geographical considerations
now control neither the applicable standard of care nor the compe-
tence of expert testimony.
The holding in Bruni is certain to have a significant impact upon
medical malpraction litigation in Ohio. This Case Comment will dis-
cuss prior Ohio law, the rationality of the new "national" standard, and
the effect that its application may have on the medical profession. It
will also analyze the ambiguities apparent in the standard as formu-
lated by the Ohio Supreme Court, and the potential application of this
national standard to the general medical practitioner.
I. BACKGROUND OF Bruni-THE LOCALITY RULES
For many years most jurisdictions3 adhered to the "strict locality"
rule governing the applicable standard of care by which a medical
practitioner's conduct was measured. According to this rule, a doctor
1. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32, at 164-65 (4th ed. 1971).
2. 46 Ohio St. 2d 127, 346 N.E.2d 673 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Woodlawn Infirmary v. Byers, 216 Ala. 210, 112 So. 831 (1927); Burton v.
Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Phillips v. Powell, 210 Cal. 39, 290 P. 441 (1930);
Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934); Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366. 138 A. 153
(1927); Swanson v. Wasson, 45 Idaho 309, 262 P. 147 (1928); Olander v. Johnson, 258 111. App.
89 (1931).
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had a duty to his patient to possess and exercise the skill and care
employed by a reasonably competent physician in the same geographic
locale.4 The rule was designed to protect the rural and small town
physician, who was often less skilled and equipped than the practi-
tioner in the large city. Despite the original appeal and apparent jus-
tification for the strict locality rule, it proved to be an unwieldy one
that frequently impeded recovery by plaintiffs who actually were
victims of medical malpractice. The rule suffered two notable defects
that hindered plaintiffs' efforts to provide competent expert testimony.
First, it in effect insulated from liability a doctor who happened to be
the sole practitioner in his community because he was considered the
only one qualified to testify as to the applicable standard. Second, a
"conspiracy of silence" among fellow practitioners in a community
often precluded the possibility of obtaining the expert testimony neces-
sary for the plaintiff to meet his burden of proof.5
Dissatisfaction with the strict locality rule led to its gradual de-
cline,6 and today many states have embraced the "same or similar lo-
cality" rule. This rule is based on the concept that a medical expert
is qualified to testify about the applicable standard of care in a mal-
practice action if his community, or other communities with which he is
acquainted, bear sufficient similarity to that in which the alleged tort
occurred. As to what constitutes a "similar community," however,
jurisdictions have differed. Some have held that the criteria by which
similarity is to be determined are such socio-economic factors as pop-
ulation, type of economy, and income level.' The better-reasoned
4. See Schireson v. Walsh, 354 I11. 40, 187 N.E. 921 (1934); Hollis v, Ahlquist, 142 Wash. 33,
251 P. 871 (1927). A like standard has been formulated with slight variations depending on the
jurisdiction. While some courts refer to a "reasonably competent" physician, a "physician in
good standing," or an "average physician," such terminology is not altogether precise, For
instance, it is clear from the cases that the use of the word "average" was never meant to sug-
gest a statistical average arrived at by examining the varying qualifications and capabilities of
physicians in a jurisdiction ranging from the most to least competent and experienced. Rather,
it appears that the term "average physician" is used in a more familiar sense to mean one of
ordinary or reasonable education and training. See, e.g., Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal, App, 2d 28, 45
P.2d 350 (1935); Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 111. 534, 8 N.E. 832 (188(6); Whitesell v. Hill. 101 Iowa
629, 70 N.W. 750 (1896).
5. Some courts have taken judicial notice of this so-called "conspiracy of silence," See,
e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957); Steiginga v. Thron, 30 N.J. Super. 423, 105 A.2d 10 (App. Div. 1954). See also Markus,
Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 520 (1965).
6. A few states still follow the "strict locality rule." See, e.g., Levitt v. Etkind, 158 Conn.
567, 265 A.2d 70 (1969); Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 161, 509 P.2d 1356 (Ct. App, 1973).
7. See, e.g., Kingston v. McGrath, 232 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1963) (applying Idaho law); Peters
v. Gelb, 30 A.2d 685 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan, 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961);
Jarboe v. Harting, 397 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965); Bailey v. Williams, 189 Neb. 484, 203 N.W2d
454 (1973); Carrigan v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 104 N.H. 73, 178 A.2d 502 (1962); Bentmiller v.
Swanson, 117 N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1962); Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation N. Hosp., 226 Or. 616,
359 P.2d 1090 (1960); Donaldson v. Maffucci, 397 Pa. 584, 156 A.2d 835 (1959); Bessinger v.
De Loach, 230 S.C. 1, 94 S.E.2d 3 (1956).
8. See, e.g., Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941); Morrill v. Komasinski,
256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
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view, espoused by many states that follow the similar locality rule, is
that factors more directly related to the practice of medicine should be
examined. The focus thus turns to a comparison of such considera-
tions as the number and quality of hospitals and laboratories and the
availability of special equipment in the defendant's and the expert's
respective communities.9
In 1902 Ohio adopted the similar locality rule in Gillette v. Tuck-
er.' ° There the Ohio Supreme Court formulated the standard as
follows:
A surgeon and physician, employed to treat a case professionally, is
under an obligation, which the law implies from the employment to
exercise the average degree of skill, care, and diligence exercised by
members of the same profession, practicing in the same or a similar
locality, in the light of the present state of medical and surgical science."1
The standard set forth in Gillette has been applied subsequently in
cases involving general practitioners,1 2 surgeons,1
3 hospital nurses,14
and even dentists.' 5 Surprisingly, neither Gillette nor any of these
subsequent cases clearly indicated the criteria by which similarity is
to be determined. Because the Gillette court formulated the standard
"in light of the present state of medical and surgical science," it ap-
pears that the basis for comparison of communities was intended to
consist of medical rather than socio-economic factors.
II. THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF Bruni
The Supreme Court of Ohio has now abandoned the similar
locality rule for cases in which the defendant is engaged in the practice
of a board-certified medical specialty. In Bruni v. Tatsumi, plaintiffs
Dorothy and Joseph Bruni brought suit against Dr. Tetsuo Tatsumi, a
neurosurgeon, and his associate for their alleged malpractice com-
mitted while Mrs. Bruni was a patient in a Canton, Ohio hospital.
As a part of the plaintiffs' case presented at trial, a neurosurgeon from
Columbus, Ohio testified by deposition that certain surgical procedures
used upon Mrs. Bruni by Dr. Tatsumi were not accepted medical
practice in Columbus. The Columbus neurosurgeon was then asked:
"Would your opinion still hold true, Doctor, for any moderately large,
9. See Gambill v. Stroud, 531 S.W.2d 945 (Ark. 1976); Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312
(Fla. Dist- Ct. App. 1962); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956).
10. 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
11. Id. at 106, 65 N.E. at 865.
12. Dietsch v. Mayberry, 70 Ohio App. 527, 47 N.E.2d 404 (1942).
13. Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928).
14. Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964).
15. Cox v. Cartwright, 96 Ohio App. 245, 121 N.E.2d 673 (1953).
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or large metropolitan area in which neurosurgery is practiced through-
out this country," to which he replied, "I believe it would."
16
The plaintiffs contended that this answer established the standard
of care in Canton, where Mrs. Bruni was treated, notwithstanding
that in earlier testimony the neurosurgeon had admitted his lack of
specific knowledge concerning medical practices in Canton and Cleve-
land. When the plaintiffs' medical expert was asked "whether [the
defendant-doctor] is using accepted and good medical technique and
procedure," he responded, "Well, I do not have an opinion about any-
thing that goes on in Canton."1 7 Additionally, when asked if his opin-
ion concerning the proper standard of care and good medical practice
would also be applicable to the Cleveland vicinity, he replied, "I do
not know how they do cases like this in Cleveland. ' 8
At the conclusion of all the evidence the trial court sustained a
motion for a directed verdict in favor of both defendants, stating that
these statements by the plaintiffs' expert about his lack of specific
knowledge of medical practice in Canton and Cleveland "nullified"
his other testimony that his methods of procedure were followed in
"metropolitan areas." Because the plaintiffs introduced no other
testimony, the trial court held that the standard of care had not been
established and that this failure "is fatal to the presentation of a prima
facie case of malpractice by the plaintiff."' 9
Although the Court of Appeals for Stark County affirmed the judg-
ment, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that it was error to
have directed a verdict for the defendants. Upon examining the origin
and development of the similar locality rule, the court found the rule's
original justification no longer applicable. At one point the court
stated:
Admittedly there was ample justification for a local-standard rule then
and for many years following. But in this modern era means of transpor-
tation facilitate opportunities for physicians and surgeons from small
communities to attend up-to-date medical seminars; the general circula-
tion of medical journals makes new developments readily available to
them and they can easily communicate with the most advanced medical
centers in the country.
[ .. T]he locality rule has been increasingly eroded as being anti-
quated and unrealistic especially in the medical specialties field.20
Finding the credentials of the plaintiffs' expert to be "flawless,"
the Ohio Supreme Court decided that a question of fact existed which
16. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 129, 346 N.E.2d at 676.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 133, 346 N.E.2d at 678 (quoting Finley v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 905, 911
(N.D. Ohio 1970)).
20. Id. at 133-34, 346 N.E.2d at 679.
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should have been presented to the jury.2 In formulating the new
standard that would supplant the locality rule for medical specialists,
the supreme court held:
The standard of care for a physician or surgeon in the practice of a
board-certified medical or surgical specialty should be that of a reason-
able specialist practicing medicine or surgery in that same specialty in
the light of present day scientific knowledge in that specialty field; there-
fore, geographical considerations or circumstances control neither the
standard of the specialist's care nor the competence of the testimony of
an expert in that specialty.
22
By adopting a standard of care that, unlike the locality rules, is
not entrenched in geographical considerations, the supreme court has
substantially altered the criteria by which the standard of care is de-
termined. Furthermore, it is readily apparent that a plaintiff's ability to
present a prima facie case is greatly enhanced by the holding in Bruni
since his difficulty in demonstrating that his expert is qualified to
testify about the applicable standard has been reduced. Bruni is thus
certain to have a significant impact upon malpractice litigation in Ohio.
III. THE AMERICAN SPECIALTY BOARDS
Before the holding in Bruni can be properly assessed, it is neces-
sary to understand the American medical profession's internal certifica-
tion system, which the Ohio Supreme Court suggested may affect the
development of standards of care in the medical profession. For many
years all that one needed in order to practice medicine legally was a
degree from a recognized medical school. Now, however, all states
require prospective practitioners to pass an examination developed by
representatives of state medical associations, and thirty-nine states also
require successful completion of a year of internship. 3 In recent
years, more uniform medical standards have resulted from the nation-
wide acceptance of examinations produced by the Federation of State
Medical Boards.
24
The origin of formal medical specialties occurred as special-
ists developed competence in narrow areas of medical practice that
21. Id. at 135, 346 N.E.2d at 679.
22. Id. at 127, 346 N.E.2d at 675 (emphasis added).
23. Holden, Specialty Board Certification as a Measure of Professional Competence. 213
J. AM. MED. A. 1016, 1016 (1970).
24. Medical Licensure 1971, 220 J. AM. MED. A., 1605, 1606 (1972). As of 1972, forty-one
states have adopted these examinations for use by their licensing boards. The examinations
are produced by the Federation of State Medical Boards to be used for qualification toward
licensure. They are administered by the participating states under their own statutes, rules.
and regulations. The test scores are reported so that all candidates' grades will be comparable
from one state to another, however, each state may decide its own passing level based on these
standard scores, thus allowing for state autonomy while providing a uniform standard for mea-
suring achievement. R. STEvENs, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND TilE PUBLIC INTERs" 534 n.8
(1972).
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exceeded the capabilities of generalists and as it became apparent that
a standardized mechanism for recognition of that competence was
desirable. The movement toward formal recognition of the medical
specialties ultimately resulted in the American Board of Medical
Specialties, a nonprofit organization under the direction of the Ameri-
can Medical Association, which represents the twenty-two approved
American Specialty Boards. 25  Ostensibly, the general aim of the
boards is to improve the quality of health care provided to the public
by medical specialists.26 To achieve this goal, each approved specialty
board determines the competence of candidates who appear volun-
tarily for examination. To that end, specialty boards decide whether
candidates have received adequate preparation in accordance with
established educational standards, provide comprehensive examina-
tions to determine the competence of candidates, and certify the
competence of those physicians who have satisfied the requirements.27
Although the various specialty boards disclaim any real power to
control specialists28-possibly to avoid antitrust implications2 9-hospitals
tend to offer more responsible positions to board-certified physicians.
Consequently, an increasing proportion of medical specialists are be-
coming board-certified. Since 1947, the Veterans Administration has
required its many medical specialists to be certified. 30  Because cer-
tain employment advantages are thus enjoyed by certified specialists,
the specialty boards seem to have more power than they officially claim.
To the extent that specialty board certification has achieved acceptance
among those in positions of making hiring and retention decisions,
certification, although not required by law in any state as a condition
to practice, has become a de facto requirement for the specialist.
The Bruni decision seems to have increased the significance of the
25. Following is a list of the American Specialty Boards and year of their approval: allergy
and immunology (1971); anesthesiology (1941); colon and rectal surgery (1949); dermatology
(1933); family practice (1969); internal medicine (1936); neurological surgery (1940); nuclear
medicine (1971); obstetrics and gynecology (1933); opthamology (1933); orthopedic surgery
(1935); otolaryngology (1933); pathology (1936); pediatrics (1933); physical medicine and re-
habilitation (1947); plastic surgery (1941); preventive medicine (1949); psychiatry and neurol-
ogy (1935); radiology (1935); surgery (1937); thoracic surgery (1970); and urology (1935). MAIt-
QUIS WHO'S-WHO, DIRECTORY OF MEDICAL SPECIALISTS xxii (17th ed. 1975-1976).
26. Id. at xviii.
27. Id. at xx.
28. The American Medical Association's Directory of Approved Intcrships and Resi-
dencies, in listing the requirements for certification, makes the disclaimer that:
The boards are in no sense educational institutions, and the certificate of a board is not
to be considered a degree. It does not confer on any person legal qualifications, priv-
ileges, nor a license to practice medicine or a specialty. The boards do not in any way
interfere with or limit the professional activities of a licenst-d physician, nor do they
desire to interfere in the regular or legitimate duties of any practitioners of medicine.
H. LERNER, MANPOWER ISSUES AND VOLUNTARY REGULATION IN TIlE MEDICAL SOCILTY
SYSTEM 123 (1974).
29. Id.
30. F. Moore, Freedom and Organization, 176 ANNALS OF SURGERY 1 (1972).
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American Specialty Boards even further; by confining the new national
standard to the board-certified specialties, the court has extended the
consequences of the medical profession's certification system to the
legal arena.
IV. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
Given the present systems of licensure and certification, the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Bruni is a rational one. To the extent
that procedures and practices in the medical specialties have become
standardized throughout the United States, a rule that refuses to give
great weight to geographical considerations is sound. The present
state of the medical profession is such that "[n]ew techniques and
discoveries are available to all doctors within a short period of time
through journals, closed circuit television presentations, special radio
networks for doctors, tape recorded digests of medical literature, and
current correspondence courses. 31
Although specialty boards are not themselves responsible for the
establishment of national standards of medical care, they appear to
make a national "standard of care" in the legal sense more operable.
By attesting to the competence of practitioners in a given specialty by
the mechanism of certification, the specialty boards have established
national requirements for certification that may be called "standards."
But these standards are in no way standards of medical care, i.e.,
recognized methods of procedure and practice. Rather, these stan-
dards take the form of educational and training requirements, such
as subjects to be covered and length of residency training, which
indicate to the practitioner the steps he should take to achieve what
the specialty boards perceive as a desired level of proficiency. In
meeting the requirements, the specialist can better ensure that he is
sufficiently apprised of those practices and procedures that provide the
foundation for a national standard of care in the legal sense. It does
not necessarily follow that meeting the requirements of certification is
an adequate means of informing oneself of national standards; how-
ever, to the extent that the certification system facilitates the ability
of all practitioners to inform themselves of the present state of their
specialties, the imposition of a national standard is less objectionable.
Adhering to a standard whereby one is held to the degree of care
expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same specialty,
as opposed to some narrower standard based on geography, does not
preclude consideration of such other factors as the availability of
facilities or the extent to which new techniques and practices have
gained general acceptance. For a plaintiff's witness to qualify as an
31. See Note, An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care, 23 V.,%;D. L
REv. 729 (1970).
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expert on the standard of care for the medical specialty in which the
defendant-doctor practices, it should suffice under the holding in Bruni
that the party offering the witness establish the familiarity of the wit-
ness with the standard of care and treatment commonly practiced by
physicians engaged in the same specialty as the defendant. That a
witness is not familiar with medical practice in the defendant's com-
munity should be of no consequence because here the standard of care
owed to patients is not tied to the defendant's locality. To the extent
that particular circumstances confronting the defendant or geographi-
cal factors peculiar to the defendant's community can fairly be said to
affect what a reasonable specialist in the field might have done, the
opportunity remains open to the defendant to introduce such evidence
for the jury's consideration.32
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Despite its apparent rationale, however, the holding in Bruni
raises some interesting questions. It is noteworthy first that the type
of practice in question, neurosurgery, is generally accepted as a spe-
cialized area of medicine and is represented by a recognized specialty
board. Furthermore, both the plaintiffs' expert medical witness and
one of the defendants were certified by that board. As noted above,
the Ohio Supreme Court held the applicable standard of care for one
engaged in the practice of a board-certified specialty to be that prac-
ticed by a reasonable specialist. The court appeared to rest its de-
cision heavily on the finding that the practice of most medical spe-
cialties by certified specialists is similar throughout the country."
One unresolved issue is whether a defendant who is not certified, but
is nevertheless engaged in the practice of a board-certified specialty,
should be held to the national standard set forth in Bruni. Another
question is whether Bruni should be read as requiring a plaintifis
expert medical witness to be certified in the defendant's specialty,
irrespective of whether the defendant is certified. Finally, the po-
tential issue remains of whether the rule in Bruni should be applied
to those areas of medicine traditionally considered areas of general
practice, but which the medical profession has denoted as specialties,
and for which specialty boards have been established.
32. See, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E,2d 793, 798 (1968) in which
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in adopting a national standard of care whereby a
practitioner is held to the degree of care of the average qualified practitioner stated: "In apply-
ing this standard it is permissible to consider the medical resources available to the physician
as one circumstance in determining the skill and care required. Under this standard some allow-
ance is thus made for the type of community in which the physician carries on his practice."
See also Shier v. Friedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 284, 206 N.W.2d 166, 174 (1973), in which the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, adopting a national standard, held: "Geographical area and its at-
tendant lack of facilities are circumstances that can be considered if appropriate."
33. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 134, 346 N.E.2d at 679.
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A. Defendant's Certification
Whether a noncertified specialist should be held to a national
standard of care and proficiency is not clearly resolved by the court's
opinion in Bruni. The court's language in Bruni, however, does sug-
gest that such a specialist will be held to the standard. The case sylla-
bus characterizes the national standard as being applicable to a phy-
sician "in the practice of a board-certified medical or surgical specialty
.. . ,,14 This indicates that a practitioner will be held to a national
standard so long as he is engaged in the practice of a specialty for
which there has been established a certifying board, regardless of
whether the defendant himself has been so certified.
The court's opinion, however, casts some doubt on whether this
interpretation is the one it intended. Justice Corrigan, writing for a
unanimous court expressly stated that an "important consideration in
this case is that . . . both the defendant and [plaintiffs'] expert wit-
ness were board-certified neurosurgeons."' 5 Additionally, to support
its finding that the similar locality rule no longer reflects the state of
the medical profession, the court cited a survey that concluded that
the practice of medicine by certified specialists within most medical
specialties is similar throughout the country.
36
Nevertheless, the ambiguous opinion also gives reason to believe
that, notwithstanding the references to certification, the court did not
perceive national certification as the foundation for a national stand-
ard, but rather as evidence that procedures and techniques have be-
come fairly standardized. In particular, Justice Corrigan stressed
that, aside from certification, contemporary "means of transportation
facilitate opportunities for physicians and surgeons from small com-
munities to attend up-to-date seminars; the general circulation of
medical journals makes new developments readily available to them
and they can easily communicate with the most advanced medical
centers in the country.""
It is also noteworthy that throughout its discussion of the appli-
cable standard of care the Ohio Supreme Court rarely modified the
words "physician" and "specialist" with the adjectives "certified"
or "board-certified." In the portion of the opinion that corresponds
to the syllabus paragraph in which the national standard is formu-
lated, the court concluded by stating that the defendant is "obligated
to bring to the discharge of his duty that degree of skill and knowledge
possessed by physicians who are specialists. ."8 Thus, "the stand-
34. Id. at 127, 346 N.E.2d at 675.
35. Id. at 132, 346 N.E.2d at 678 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 134, 346 N.E.2d at 679.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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ard of care in this case is that owed to a patient by the community of
neurosurgeons."39  In neither instance was it implied that only certi-
fied specialists or neurosurgeons are referred to.
While it is by no means clear from Bruni whether it should apply
to noncertified practitioners, this construction is desirable. To hold
otherwise would allow a practitioner to insulate himself from a na-
tional standard simply by foregoing certification. This is perhaps the
reason why no other jurisdiction that has abandoned the locality rule
in favor of a national standard has applied the newer standard solely
to certified practitioners. Instead, they have held the national standard
to apply either to all physicians,40 or at least to all specialists, whether
or not certified. 4' Even if not intended by the Ohio Supreme Court,
that interpretation is defensible on the ground that the existence of
uniform procedures nationwide-resulting in part from the improved
means of disseminating the most current medical developments, and
not solely because of the specialty boards-furnishes the real justifica-
tion for a national standard of care. The irrationality of allowing
certification to determine the applicability of the national standard is
demonstrated by the fact that, although as of 1972, 62.3%42 of all
specialists were board-certified, a substantial number of those not
certified were "board eligible"; 43 they had met such prerequisites for
taking the certification exam as residency and training, but had not
actually taken the examination. Because the opportunity to inform
oneself of the most current medical developments in one's specialty
does not appear to be substantially affected by certification, it would
be difficult to justify applying different standards of care to the board-
certified and the "board eligible" practitioner.
Nevertheless, because certification is regarded as evidence that
one is qualified in his specialty, 44 the fact that a defendant is not
board-certified could affect the jury's assessment of the applicable
standard of care, especially if the plaintiffs witness is certified. To
the extent that noncertification affects perceptions of a defendant's
ability to follow proper medical procedure, the Bruni decision will
provide another inducement to become certified in addition to those
incentives already provided by the medical profession itself.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n. 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245
(1975); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
41. See, e.g., Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972); Nacarrato v. Grob,
384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970).
42. H. LERNER, supra note 28, at 169.
43. Id. at 124.
44. Holden, supra note 23, at 1018.
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B. Certification of the Testifying Expert
Another issue that Bruni raises is whether the expert witness
must be a certified specialist engaged in the practice of a board-certi-
fied specialty. A negative answer is likely in future cases. In Bruni
the court held that the applicable standard of care should be that of a
"reasonable specialist practicing medicine or surgery in that same spe-
cialty in the light of present day scientific knowledge in that spe-
cialty field.' 45  Furthermore, in its earlier discussion of the need for
expert testimony to show medical malpractice, the court stated that the
expert "must be qualified to express an opinion concerning the specific
standard of care that prevails in the medical community in which the
alleged malpractice took place ... ,46 Thus, the competency of an
expert will probably hinge not on whether he is board-certified but on
whether he is sufficiently acquainted with proper procedures of reason-
able specialists. Nowhere does the court suggest that certification is
a requisite to knowing what is reasonable. Rather, a determination
of competency requires a consideration of the same factors that the
Bruni court used to justify a national standard; that is, it should be
incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that his witness has availed him-
self of the opportunities open to him through such means as journals
and seminars to familiarize himself with the current state of the pro-
fession. Certification is not irrelevant to the determination of his
competency to testify; to the extent that certification is evidence of his
professional qualifications and of his familiarity with the applicable
standard, certification is a significant factor to be considered by the
court. The fact that one is not certified, however, should not preclude
him from otherwise demonstrating his competence to testify.
Courts in several states that adhere to the "strict" or "same or
similar" locality rule have held that a physician or surgeon is not in-
competent to testify merely because he is not a specialist in the particu-
lar branch of medicine involved in the case.47 Prior to Bruni, when
all practitioners were subject to the similar locality rule, an Ohio court
of appeals held in Faulkner v. Pezeshki 8 that a general practitioner
was competent to testify in a malpractice action against a specialist.
The court stated: "We are of the view that the witnesses had, by edu-
cation, training, and experience, sufficient expertise to aid the jury in
its task of determining whether defendant was negligent. Admittedly
45. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 127, 346 N.E.2d at 675.
46. Id. at 132, 346 N.E.2d at 677.
47. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887 (1975); Hanberry v. Fitz-
gerald, 72 N.M. 383, 384 P.2d 256 (1963); Simpson v. Glenn, 537 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. CL App.
1976).
48. 44 Ohio App. 2d 186, 337 N.E.2d 158 (1975).
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better witnesses may exist, but such fact should not have barred the
testimony of the witness produced. 49
This rule of evidence has been accepted by at least one state
supreme court in the context of a national standard of care. In Car-
bone v. Warburton, a 1953 case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that the applicable standard for a specialist was a national
one. 50 The court also held that the key qualifications of a medical ex-
pert are his knowledge and experience in treatment of the illness or
injury involved. Upon inquiry into those qualifications, the trial judge
can determine whether the witness has sufficient acquaintance with
the standards recognized by the medical profession in the situation
under investigation to justify his testifying as an expert."' Applying
this test, the New Jersey court found that a retired general practi-
tioner was qualified to testify about the standard of care applicable
to an orthopedic specialist because the witness possessed an exten-
sive medical education and had kept abreast of medical and surgical
developments.5 2  If an expert witness need not be a specialist in the
same area of medicine as the defendant in order to be held compe-
tent, a fortiori he need not be a certified specialist in that field.
Thus, certification is just one factor among several to be consid-
ered in assessing the witness' familiarity with the applicable standard.
Nevertheless, as in the case of the defendant, certification is a factor
that might be considered by the jury in its evaluation of an expert's
testimony.
C. Applicability of Bruni to the General Practitioner
The Ohio Supreme Court may not have been aware in reaching
its holding in Bruni that several certification boards exist for "spe-
cialties" that are not generally thought of as such by the general public.
At least two other jurisdictions that have limited the applicability of a
national standard to specialties have given specialties a rather narrow
meaning.5 3 The Bruni decision thus raises the issue whether the scope
of its holding should be limited to this narrower category of specialties
or instead should encompass all board-certified specialties, including
those that are considered by many to be generalized areas of practice.
49. Id. at 193, 337 N.E.2d at 164.
50. 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953). There the court held:
[O]ne who holds himself out as specialist must employ not merely the skill of a general
practitioner but also that special degree of skill normally possessed by the average
physician who devotes special study and attention to the particular organ or disease or
injury involved, having regard to the present state of scientific knowledge.
Id. at 426, 94 A.2d at 683.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 426-27, 94 A.2d at 684.
53. See Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972); Naccarato v. Grob, 384
Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970).
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By contrasting the Ohio Supreme Court's rationale to that expressed in
a recent line of Michigan decisions that exempted such nontraditional
specialties from a national standard, a reasonable inference may be
made that they are not to be so excluded in Ohio courts.
In Naccarato v. Grob54 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
specialists should be held to a national standard. While the defen-
dants in that case were board-certified pediatricians, the court did not
view certification as a decisive factor in concluding that a national
standard was appropriate for specialists. Rather, the court based its
holding on the inherent nature of a specialty:
The reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist and the wealth
and sources of his knowledge are not limited to the geographic area in
which he practices. Rather his knowledge is a specialty. He specializes
so that he may keep abreast. Any other standard for a specialist would
negate the fundamental expectations and purpose of a specialty. The
standard of care for a specialist should be that of a reasonable specialist
practicing medicine in the light of present day scientific knowledge.
Therefore, geographical conditions or circumstances control neither the
standard of a specialist's care nor the competence of an expert's testi-
mony.5
5
The Naccarato court declined to extend its holding to general prac-
titioners, stating that "[w]hatever the considerations were that al-
lowed the area practice to set the standard for the county general
practitioner-they are not relevant to a metropolitan specialist."5 6
In Callahan v. William Beaumont Hospital 7 a Michigan court of
appeals expressly held that general practitioners were still to be held
to the similar locality rule and were not affected by the holding in
Naccarato, which was "grounded to a large degree on the reliance
and expectations of the public with respect to the skills possessed by
a specialist." 58 Apparently in an effort to clarify the distinction made
by the Naccarato court between general practitioners and specialists,
the court stated that by becoming a specialist, a practitioner "thereby
represents to the public that he has special knowledge and skills not
possessed by a general practitioner and that he also keeps abreast with
the advances in his specialty."5 9
In Abbe v. Woman's Hospital Association" another Michigan
court of appeals raised a further question concerning the applicability
of Naccarato. The court decided that the defendant, a general sur-
geon, should be held to the similar community rule, not to a national
54. 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970).
55. Id. at 253-54, 180 N.W.2d at 791.
56. Id. at 253, 180 N.W.2d at 791.
57. 67 Mich. App. 306, 240 N.W.2d 781 (1976).
58. Id. at 310, 240 N.W.2d at 782-83.
59. Id. at 310, 240 N.W.2d at 783.
60. 35 Mich. App. 429, 192 N.W.2d 691 (1971).
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standard: "He is what may be designated as a general surgeon. He
does not fall within the category which must be judged by the stand-
ard of specialists in specific areas of the practice of medicine."
61
The significance of these Michigan cases becomes apparent when
they are considered together. Naccarato made it fairly clear that the
national standard was applicable only to specialists, specifically omit-
ting general practitioners from the ambit of the holding. It is less clear
that the Michigan Supreme Court intended to exclude general sur-
geons from the national standard. In any event, Abbe interpreted the
generic term "specialists" to mean doctors engaged in a narrowly de-
fined area of practice, and consequently held general surgeons not to
be specialists.
It does not appear that Bruni v. Tatsumi should be given such
limited applicability in light of the rationale articulated by the Su-
preme Court of Ohio in reaching its decision. Had the court expressed
a rationale similar to that given by the Supreme Court of Michigan-
"[t]he reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist," and the
"fundamental expectations" of a specialty-then a, rule confined to the
"traditional" specialties would be justifiable in Ohio. The Supreme
Court of Ohio, however, focused in Bruni not on the public's expecta-
tions but on the medical profession itself. From that viewpoint the
court found that increased mobility and contemporary modes of dis-
seminating information had resulted in improved accessibility to ad-
vanced medical centers and to the latest medical developments. Fur-
thermore, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged the American Spe-
cialty Boards, their standard requirements for certification, and a
survey that concluded that the practice of a medical specialty by
certified specialists is similar throughout the country.
At present there are specialty boards for twenty-two areas of
medical practice. One, the American Board of Surgery, certifies
physicians engaged in the practice of general surgery and pediatric
surgery.62 Much of the impetus for the establishment of this board
arose from the fact that physicians engaged in general surgery had
been excluded from other specialty surgical boards. 3 Since its es-
tablishment in 1937, specialty boards in other surgical specialties such
as neurological surgery, thoracic surgery, and colon and rectal surgery
have also been approved. Nevertheless, the American Board of Sur-
gery and the American Board of Medical Specialists recognize gen-
eral surgery as a specialty in itself. Of perhaps even greater impor-
tance is the fact that in 1969 a specialty board entitled "The American
Board of Family Practice" was approved by the American Medical
61. Id. at 433-34, 192 N.W.2d at 693.
62. DIRECTORY OF MEDICAL SPECIALISTS, supra note 25, at xxii.
63. R. STEVENS, supra note 24, at 236.
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Association. That board recognizes the area of general practice as a
medical specialty.
Despite the establishment of the American Board of Surgery and
the American Board of Family Practice, the public has not yet ac-
cepted the general surgeon and the general practitioner as being
specialists of the same level of expertise as those in the traditional
specialties.64 Thus the public's expectations of a general surgeon or
general practitioner are likely to be lower than its expectations of the
sophisticated specialist. If the public's expectations are viewed as the
major justification for denoting an area of medicine a specialty to
which a national standard should be applied-as they are viewed by the
Michigan Supreme Court-excluding the general surgeon or practitioner
from the application of a national standard is defensible.
Nevertheless, because the rationale of the Ohio Supreme Court
in Bruni focused on the medical profession itself rather than on reli-
ance by the public upon the skills of a specialist, the public's reluc-
tance to recognize the general surgeon or general practitioner as a
specialist should not preclude the applicability of a national standard to
such practitioners in Ohio. Assuming the national uniformity of prac-
tices as the rationale for the holding in Bruni, it appears that in the fu-
ture the Ohio Supreme Court will not regard the American Specialty
Boards as delimiting the scope of the national standard of care, and
will apply the standard to all areas of practice in which uniformity of
practice can be shown.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bruni decision will have a significant and beneficial effect
upon medical malpractice litigation. During a time when practices
and procedures are attaining levels of national uniformity, a standard
of care that is coextensive with this standardization is welcome.
As noted above, the Bruni decision raises several questions con-
cerning its scope. In view of the rationale articulated by the Ohio
Supreme Court, the factor of American Specialty Board certification
should not be viewed as the fundamental justification for a nationally
defined standard of care even though it may have played a part in the
decision. The actual justification for a national standard lies in the
increasing uniformity of medical practice nationwide, not in the exis-
tence of the national certification boards. Unquestionably, the boards
play an important role in establishing and administering standards by
which competence is to be judged. As noted earlier, however, these
are not the equivalent of a national standard of care. Consequently,
Bruni should be applied to specialties such as family practice and
64. See generaly id., ch. 14.
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general surgery, for which certification boards do exist but which the
public does not commonly recognize as specialized areas of medical
practice. For the same reason, Bruni should be read as requiring
the application of a national standard of care without regard to
whether the defendant is himself certified, and should not be seen as
imposing certification of a plaintiff's witness as a prerequisite to his
competency.
Dale P. Shrallow
